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Food standards provide an interesting comparative case study to timber verification, for a number of reasons. Firstly, food items are, like wood and fibre, widely traded internationally. Secondly, consumer nations demand high standards of the products in question in both cases. Thirdly, like forests, food figures as an important motif for the state of the environment, especially in the industrial north. Northern environmental NGOs and the media have played a major role in influencing food policy in Europe, just as they have done with timber policy. And finally, food control and food safety have been the subjects of major institutional reforms in recent years within the European Union - reforms which have their origins in food crises, as well as in changing standards of public acceptability.
This study presents an instructive perspective on how verification requirements change when the underlying model of control also changes; in this instance, from a prescriptive control system to a hazards-based one. Among the features of particular interest in this case are the ways in which public acceptability has been increased by linking control requirements to the interests of the industry. This makes sense in view of the concern of commercial operators with their 'bottom line' of profitability. Given the recent history of timber management, the credits given to operators for involvement in certification and labelling systems are also of relevance, and perhaps directly transferable. Changing perceptions of the nature of, and need for, 'independent' scrutiny are likewise of interest, as are the institutional structures to deliver it.
There are, however, some crucial differences between food and timber. While both may function as a motif for the state of the environment, the breadth of interest differs somewhat. For example, the central concerns in food standards (human health and safety) have immediate and personal implications for western consumers at large, whereas in the case of wood and fibre, the primary interest is limited to those who are 'environmentally aware'. The animal welfare dimension is more comparable, however, in this respect.
Food also differs from timber, particularly in a trade context, in that it has intrinsic qualities (for example, its capacity to cause disease or sickness) that encourage its regulation, and such regulation is unlikely to be contested under the WTO regime, at least in principle. This refers to the concept of 'PPMs' (process and production methods). PPMs in the food industry tend to be of the 'related' class, where the final product is altered by the methods in question (as opposed to 'unrelated' PPMs where the product is unchanged as is the case with verified timber). Both are affected by the WTO because they may constitute restrictions on trade. However, controls placed on production methods which might be harmful to human health (for example, treatment with hormones or organic acids) would be less likely to receive a challenge under WTO rules than would, say, controls to restrict trade to legal and/or sustainable timber when the item itself is indistinguishable from illegal or unsustainable timber.
There is some controversy within the WTO as to the treatment of these two types of PPMs. The TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement) is the governing regulation here, and this may give an exemption to PPMs which are subject to international standards. However, this probably applies only to 'related PPMs'. Unrelated PPMs may have some cover under Article XX of the original 1947 GATT agreement, which concerns general exemptions. These include measures relating to health standards and also the conservation of exhaustible natural resources (provided these are applied on a consistent basis, domestically and internationally). Food safety controls also enjoy additional justification under the Agreement on Phytosanitary Measures and the Codex Alimentariu s (Box One of the main case study).
Finally, this case study deals with two countries (UK and the Netherlands) in which overall public governance is fairly strong. This needs to be taken into account when assessing the transferability of principles such as 'one up one down' traceability, which depend heavily on the potential for effective sanctions all along the food chain.
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