Illegal logging is a hot topic in forest policy.
As pressures grow to keep illegal products out of the timber trade,
national governments are increasingly concerned about verifying the legality of their timber production.
What does this mean for forests and those who rely on them?
Will it increase the benefits to the poor or limit their access to forest resources?
What does it mean for forest governance?
Are increasing international agreements over forest resources good for the forests and their peoples,
or do they further reduce their capacity
to manage their resources for their own future benefits?
Questions like these underpin VERIFOR - a major research project on verification involving ODI and its international partners: CATIE in Costa Rica, CIFOR in Central Africa,
and RECOFTC in Asia. |
On 27-28 April 2006, VERIFOR held an international experts' consultation meeting in Palma de Mallorca, Spain.
This workshop brought together 34 forestry and verification professionals from 15 countries with the aim
"to help identify principles for effective verification practice which are equitable (socially just/not damaging to the poor) and developmentally sound".
The meeting was structured around four themes: ownership, independence, legality standards and developmental impacts of verification, illustrated with case studies from British Columbia, Cameroon, Ecuador, Ghana and Malaysia. The last session took the form of a regional panel discussion, in which participants from Africa, Asia and Latin America were invited to present the key issues and challenges relating to verification in their regions. A meeting report, background materials and presentations are available for download from our website.
|
Ownership
This theme raises a number of important questions:
- Do the objectives of the verification system determine the degree of ownership?
- Is government ownership increased by engaging a broad section of public agencies and levels? And, does government ownership necessarily reflect broader public ownership?
- Is public ownership increased by strengthening accountability and transparency mechanisms?
- Can ownership be achieved when the impacts of the verification system are not perceived to be beneficial?
Some key issues are: the need to engage beyond the forest sector ministry at the national level; how to build public ownership where trust in the government is low; and to what extent improved processes of participation and access to accountability mechanisms will increase public ownership. It is also noted that ownership is not just achieved by the process, but will be affected by the outcomes of the verification system, though some steps might help to strengthen national ownership:
- Strengthening complementarities with existing monitoring and auditing procedures (e.g. for CITES).
- Harmonising with decentralised roles and responsibilities.
- Matching verification system design with capacity.
Discussions brought out the importance of broad participation to define verification objectives as the first step to develop a publically owned verification system, and the need for systems to be adaptive and flexible. In terms of national ownership, it was felt that there needs to be clarity in the international processes which producer countries are asked to sign up to. National ownership might be demonstrated in two ways: by taking decision-making on verification to the highest levels of government; or by the commitment of resources, both financial and human. |
Independence
A number of forces need to reconciled:
- Independence is needed to ensure some objectivity, but the forest resource is under sovereign ownership.
- However, there are severe governance problems in many producer countries.
- Yet, forests have global public goods values which are not currently reflected in an international agreement on their use.
A number of questions require further study:
-
Is the credibility of a verification system a function of the independence of verifiers from all interests in the forest estate?
-
With regards to the verification agency, three issues arise:
- Does independence require the intervention of international actors?
- Are environmental rights NGOs or private sector organisations better placed to act as verifiers?
- Is greater democratic accountability likely to come from architectural arrangements, rather than the operation of individual monitors?
-
The broader the mandate of verification, the more difficult it will be to apply a concept of independence. Financing is also key: is funding secured and allocated through the national legislature more likely to safeguard the independence of the verifier than ad hoc arrangements with the sector ministry, donors or the private sector?
Discussions emphasised the need for mechanisms that ensure accountability, transparency, objectivity, competence, cross-checks and balances; most workshop partcipants agreed that verification delivered through a single actor is not sufficient to guarantee independence. It was argued that it is hard to find any entity which is truly independent; the underlying concern is more with how to achieve credibility. Distance from local interests, and transparency, were felt to be central elements of independence. The importance of independent public reporting was also noted, although there is a tension between the transparency reflected in direct reporting to the public (without government censorship) and the potential for this separation from government to make accountability mechanisms less clear. Many participants felt that a distinction has to be made between routinised audit-type activities and the 'whistle-blowing' approach, which demand quite different skills and suit different organisations. |
Legality Standards
Legal and regulatory frameworks affecting the forest sector are often highly complex (leaving many operators illegal) and do not provide a clear enough basis for audit. In the short term this situation requires:
- Prioritisation of existing laws and regulations depending on the objective and mandate of the verification system
- Augmentation of regulatory frameworks with clear standards of performance (SOPs).
Experience suggests two operating principles, though these present many dilemmas:
- Legitimacy. National standard-setting inevitably creates space to contest norms: it is hard to place boundaries around this debate, but it needs to be anticipated.
- Applicability. How implementable is the standard?
Broader unresolved questions remain:
- Is it possible to set standards without further legal reform, especially where existing law 'criminalises' the poor?
- What will be the relationship of the standard with the law; who will have the authority to issue certificates and will they vouch for 'compliance with a standard' or 'compliance with the law'?
Discussions highlighted that we should expect countries to take a variety of approaches as legality is a sovereign issue. It was agreed that the definition of a standard should be a consultative process, and will depend upon the objectives behind the process. For example, some countries would set legality standards to satisfy external markets, others to meet the demands of internal constituencies where national standards are not being complied with. Three approaches to defining a legality standard were identified: (1) proceed from the existing legal framework; (2) start with defining criteria and indicators which may be higher or lower than existing standards; (3) narrow the scope of verification e.g. to chain of custody alone. The issue of whether a standard would operate as a code of practice, or be enacted in law, and the implications of this distinction, were also raised.
|
Developmental Impacts
The impacts of a verification system will depend, among others, on:
- The objectives of the system. These are often conflicting, e.g. retaining market access, increasing government's revenue capture, improving governance and the rule of law in the forest sector.
- The policy/legislative framework within which the system operates. Even effective verification cannot achieve more than is required by law.
- The overall design of the system and how it is implemented.
Some positive developmental impacts can be observed: recognition of indigenous community rights in Sabah, Malaysia; recognition of the uncertain land tenure status of many small-scale producers (Brazil, Ecuador, Costa Rica); the use of mobile state regulatory units offering easier access to legality (Brazil, Ecuador, Costa Rica); and improved information to communities on their share of tax revenues (Cameroon). Several measures may minimise potential negative impacts on the poor:
- Poverty impact assessments or cost/benefit analyses during system design.
- Parallel processes of legal reform.
- Separate, easily accessible permit systems for poor producers.
- Improved transparency over revenue flows.
- Dispute resolution mechanisms to enable people to complain about the effects of the system.
Discussions began by agreeing that forest use had strong developmental impacts. Even where developmental objectives are not enshrined in law, they can still be monitored and evaluated. It was argued that in many producer countries, forest laws are strongly influenced by the industrial lobby which does not have moral objectives. However, as many governments do state equitable forest management as a policy goal, there might be a cascade of policies and laws such that increasing legal compliance would support its attainment. The potential role of a verification system to increase the information available to stakeholders was noted, which can help to develop trust in the system among other benefits. However, it was pointed out that the verification system itself will not determine outcomes - they depend on the agreement or the law in question - though its products may help to further legal reform. |
 
|
Publications
VERIFOR Briefing Papers
No. 1 'Designing Verification Systems for the Timber Trade: Learning from International Processes'
This briefing paper discusses lessons for the forest sector from verification experiences under international treaties and conventions, including the Kimberley Process for diamonds, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
No. 2 'On Independence in Verification Work'
The issue of independence goes to the heart of the questions: ‘who is verification for?’ What constituencies should it serve? How can it be given credibility? The principle of independence is likewise central to the enterprise of verification, and engages directly with critical debates about good governance, ‘national ownership’ and efficiency.
VERIFOR Options
No. 1 'Strategies for Independent Monitoring'
This paper considers options for independent monitoring of the timber trade, as a component of verification systems.
This is the first of a series of 'VERIFOR Options' papers designed to provide clear, succinct and non-partisan information on
approaches for policy-makers (Full text on our website).
VERIFOR Case Studies
The following case studies from within and outside the forest sector are available for download on our website.
Forest Sector Case Studies
Ghana
This case study explores efforts to improve forest law enforcement and control over a timber sector that is characterised by poor levels of governance. Recent government initiatives to reform legislation and invest in verification through the Validation of Legal Timber Programme are examined, and their impacts discussed. Finally, the study suggests some conditions which should be met if a partnership agreement on timber verification is to bring benefits to Ghana.
Indonesia
This case study draws lessons from the development of a legality standard via
the 2002 UK-Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance, and examines proposals
for its institutionalisation and eventual management. The legal framework, institutional
structures and criteria and indicators for mandatory verification of legality are then analysed. The study explores the extent to which current systems
are able to respond to decentralisation and efforts to widen the scope for community-based forest management.
Cambodia
This study compares the process and impact of two contrasting models of independent monitoring in the forest sector in Cambodia:
that provided by an international advocacy NGO and that provided by an international consultancy company. In so doing it
explores lessons for the design of verification systems in contexts with complex governance, an absence of political will
and the lack of clear market incentives for legality.
Ecuador
This study analyses Ecuador's experience of the successful but short-lived "National Outsourced Forest Control
System", an innovative institutional arrangement in which civil society,
private professional foresters and a verification company formed a comprehensive system to which the
government delegated forest administration, verification and control activities. The study examines the political economy that
caused the model to be boycotted by the timber industry and attempts to distil the main lessons learnt from this experience.
Canada (British Columbia)
The Forest Practices Board of British Columbia is a unique public watchdog. It audits the activities of both timber companies
and the government, investigates public complaints and carries out special investigations into issues of general concern. This
case study examines the role of this independent body in increasing public confidence in the forest industry.
Philippines
This case study describes the establishment of 'Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committees' (MFPCs) which provided a means
to involve civil society and other concerned parties in monitoring. The study explores the benefits which public involvement
offers to state agencies both in terms of image enhancement and effectiveness.
Malaysia
This study examines structures for legal verification in the Peninsula, Sabah and Sarawak areas of Malaysia. In all three
areas verification is based largely on state administrative structures, though checks and balances have been introduced
in a variety of different ways. This includes outsourced monitoring of log movements, ISO audits of timber administration,
certification as a complement to internal audits of SFM, as well as ad hoc use of 3rd party auditors. The case study also
examines mechanisms for the administration and legal verification of timber imports, as well as of mill input/output.
Brazil
This study illustrates the importance of political commitment and coordination at the highest level of government in tackling the causes that underlie illegality in the forest sector in a country as large and complex as Brazil. It touches on some of the issues which restrict sustainable timber production, such as land use change and forest land tenure, and discusses the impact of changes in the forest sector legal framework. In this context, the study describes the currently on-going creation of a decentralised forest administration and verification system under the coordination of a national forest authority.
Nepal
This study considers the prospects for verification of legality in the Terai region where most of Nepal's commercial forestry takes place. It presents the strengths and weakness of the existing system, and the origins of its present difficulties. It then reviews Nepal's main anti-corruption agency, the Commission to Investigate the Abuse of Authority (CIAA), to see what lessons might be learnt to help improve commercial forest management. The paper is intended as a scoping study – to identify issues for future research, and to stimulate debate on how to improve forest management in a difficult governance situation.
Comparative Case Studies
The Kimberley Process Certification System (KPCS)
The 2003 Kimberley Process Certification System (KPCS) for rough diamonds is an outcome of the 'Kimberley Process',
which aims to end the trade in conflict diamonds. It is a
voluntary international certification scheme based on agreed minimum standards. This paper provides lessons for the
design of verification mechanisms for extractive natural resource sectors which are closely associated with conflict
and weak governance but are also heavily influenced by the market and civil society.
Nuclear Safeguards
The safeguards system of the IAEA covers materials that can be used in nuclear weapons. The IAEA statute is the hub of
the system and gives it the right to examine specialised equipment and facilities of Member States to assure that they
will not further any military purpose. The case study discusses the balance between self-reporting and independent oversight.
It provides insights for verification in sectors with strategic national and international importance but which are operating
in a geopolitically unequal playing field.
The Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
CITES is a trade-based convention with broad international participation. It provides an interesting case of verification
with a focus on trade and a consignment-based approach. The study
demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of a structure where verification is almost entirely in the hands of the signatory
states and the implications of attempting to use one system to verify diverse trade in thousands of species. It also provides
lessons on how to prevent migration to non-parties and less discerning markets.
Verification for Food Safety: The Case of the Meat Industry
Food standards provide an interesting comparative case study to timber verification. Food items are widely traded internationally, and consumer nations demand high standards of the products. Like forests, food figures as an important motif for the state of the environment, especially in the industrial north. Northern environmental NGOs and the media have played a major role in influencing food policy in Europe, just as they have done with timber policy. And finally, food control and food safety have been the subjects of major institutional reforms in recent years within the European Union.
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Verification of gas emissions faces particular problems of uncertainty, because of their intangibility, the variety of factors that influence them, and continuing disagreements on the monitoring methodologies. Verification under the UNFCCC aims to test compliance with the binding GHG emissions reduction targets identified in the Kyoto Protocol. The paper describes the verification system, which is managed by an international secretariat but based on national reporting. |
Photos: FAO, Roberto Faidutti, CFU000551 & CFU000559, Norbert Winkler FO-0838, Rough Diamond Review.
The content of this newsletter is the sole responsibility of VERIFOR and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the EU or other donors.
|
We would welcome your views. Please provide any feedback to Josephine Tucker at j.tucker@odi.org.uk
VERIFOR: Institutional Options for Forest Verification
|
|
VERIFOR Activities
PHASE 1 (Research) led to an experts' meeting to review existing verification systems, both within the forest sector and beyond, and will see the publication of an edited volume.
- Early 2006 - Publication of Case Studies and analysis of verification systems, to be made available on the project website.
- April 2006 - International Experts' Meeting in Palma de Mallorca, Spain.
PHASE 2 will build a dialogue with interested parties to design verification systems that are well attuned to country realities and which enjoy broad national ownership.
-
2006 - Launch of regional networks on forest verification.
-
2006 - Series of regional meetings with national governments and regional agencies, to begin partnership development.
-
2006 - Development and implementation of capacity building strategy.
-
2007 to 2008 - Identifying participating countries, understanding their challenges and supporting verification system design & implementation.
-
2009 - Major conference to share experiences and outputs internationally.
|
- Project case studies, publications and presentations available for download
- Further project information
- Background literature and project bibliography
- Sign up for future issues of the VERIFOR newsletter
Or contact us at
forestry@odi.org.uk |
Who We Are:
Project Partners
ODI (UK) - Lead Organisation.
ODI is a leading independent research institute with over 40 years experience of working with southern and northern development organisations and policy processes. The Forest Policy and Environment Group at ODI specialises in policy research dealing with issues of poverty reduction, governance and sustainable natural resource management in developing countries.
Project Director - David Brown d.brown@odi.org.uk
CATIE Costa Rica - Latin America
The Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE) is a non-governmental, not-for-profit organisation with a long history of involvement in the forestry sector in Central and South America, supporting the development of sustainable forest management and facilitating political dialogue between stakeholders and governments through local and regional networks.
Latin America Focal Point - Hans Thiel hthiel@plus.net.ec
CIFOR Central Africa Office, Cameroon - Africa
The Regional Office for West and Central Africa of the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), an international not-for-profit organisation with its Headquarters in Indonesia, is the regional partner for Africa. It will participate in cases studies for the region and lead training and dissemination.
Africa Focal Point - Tim Fometé timfomete@yahoo.fr
RECOFTC Thailand - Asia.
The Regional Community Forestry Training Centre for Asia and the Pacific (RECOFTC) is an autonomous, not-for-profit organisation that works closely with partners to design and facilitate learning processes and systems to support community forestry and natural resource management.
Asia Focal Point - Robert Oberndorf orobert@ku.ac.th
|
Forthcoming Regional Events
COFLAC Meeting Side-event 27 June
The FAO Forestry Comission for Latin America and the Caribbean (COFLAC) will hold its bi-annual meeting in the Dominican Republic from 26-30 June. The VERIFOR Latin America team is planning a breakfast event on 27 June.
Workshop on Legality Standards in Africa
In partnership with CED (Centre pour l'Environnement et le Développement, Cameroon) VERIFOR plans to hold a workshop for civil society and policymakers in the Central African region, on legal standard-setting for forest verification.
In Asia, VERIFOR is actively engaging with regional groups and initiatives such as the World Bank sponsored East Asia Pacific FLEG, EC FLEGT, and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), while looking for direct opportunities to engage in the region wherever there is a demand for our knowledge and expertise. |
Meet the VERIFOR team
The VERIFOR team is:
David Brown
Hans Thiel
Tim Fometé
Robert Oberndorf
Adrian Wells
Cecilia Luttrell
Chimère Diaw
Guillermo Navarro
Kate Schreckenberg
Neil Bird
Josephine Tucker
Each newsletter will describe the interests of some members of the team. This issue introduces David Brown and Hans Thiel.
David Brown
Project Director, ODI, London
David Brown is a Research Fellow and Director of the Forest Policy and Environment Programme at ODI. He specialises in tropical forest policy, particularly the institutional dimensions of community-based forestry and biodiversity conservation, and environmental governance issues. His recent work has included research and advisory work on the integration of environmental sustainability and poverty reduction.
Hans Thiel
Focal Point for Latin America, based in Quito, Ecuador
Hans Thiel´s experience in forestry stems from industry and small-scale farmers in Ecuador. As Vice-Minister for forest & biodiversity issues in Ecuador, he designed and implemented the Outsourced Forest Control System and initiated change of the legal framework that governs forestry. Since leaving this position in 2003 he has worked to support normative and institutional processes around forest governance and illegal logging in Latin America and Africa.
|
|
